Workers' compensation in the United States: high costs, low benefits by Boden, Leslie
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Department of Environmental Health SPH Environmental Health Papers and Presentations
1995
Workers' compensation in the
United States: high costs, low
benefits
Boden, L. I. (1995). Workers' compensation in the united states: High costs, low
benefits. Annual Review of Public Health, 16, 189-218.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/1159
Boston University
Annu. Rev. Public Health. 1995. 16:189-218 
Copyright II:) 1995 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES: High 
Costs, Low Benefits 
L. I. Boden 
Department of Environmental Health, Boston University School of Public Health, 
Boston, Massachusetts 02118 
KEY WORDS: workers' compensation, occupational safety, occupational health, medical 
costs, litigation 
ABSTRACT 
Studies suggest that income replacement is low for many workers with serious 
occupational injuries and illnesses. This review discusses three areas that hold 
promise for raising benefits to workers while reducing workers' compensation 
costs to employers: improving safety, containing medical costs, and reducing 
litigation. 
In theory, workers' compensation increases the costs to employers of injuries 
and so provides incentives to improve safety. Yet, taken as a whole, research 
does not provide convincing evidence that workers' compensation reduces 
injury rates. Moreover, unlike safety and health regulation, workers' compen­
sation focuses the attention of employers on individual workers. High costs 
may lead employers to discourage claims and litigate when claims are filed. 
Controlling medical costs can reduce workers' compensation costs. Most 
studies, however, have focused on costs and have not addressed the effective­
ness of medical care or patient satisfaction. Research also has shown that 
workers' compensation systems can reduce the need for litigation. Without 
litigation, benefits can be delivered more quickly and at lower costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 25 years, workers' compensation has moved from an issue 
unknown to governors and legislators to a central focus of public debate in 
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190 BODEN 
many states. In the 1970s, legislative changes focused on improving coverage 
of workers and conditions, the adequacy of benefits, and the effective delivery 
of these benefits. A prime mover was the report of the National Commission 
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (57), created by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970. The National Commission's report described 
deficiencies in and made recommendations for improving workers' compen­
sation systems (57). In the decade that followed, many states changed their 
statutes, increasing coverage and raising benefits. In 1972, the 50 states com­
plied, on average, with 6.8 of the 19 essential recommendations of the National 
Commission. By 1980, they had moved to complying with an average of 12.0 
of these recommendations (23). 
During the past decade, the public policy discussion has changed from 
delivering benefits to containing costs. Between 1972 and 1992, the costs of 
workers' compensation rose from $6 billion to $62 billion (24), an annual rate 
of growth of 12.5 percent, with workers' compensation costs going from 1.1 
percent to 2.6 percent of payroll. 
As employers became aware of the substantial growth in costs, they 
increasingly looked for ways to reduce them. One obvious way is to lobby 
for limits on benefits or on compensable conditions, and some states have 
recently legislated such cutbacks (69). But there are other methods of 
reducing costs, more consistent with the goals established by Congress in 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 for "an adequate, prompt, 
and equitable system of compensation." This review explores some of these 
other options. 
First, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses reduces the need for 
workers' compensation benefits, lowering costs without reducing benefit lev­
els. This article reviews evidence about the impact of workers' compensation 
on safety. Unfortunately, we find little evidence that workers' compensation 
provides employers with incentives to improve safety. This suggests that 
government officials look elsewhere for policies to reduce injury and illness 
rates. 
Second, if workers' compensation systems provide benefits at lower cost, 
expenditures can be reduced without cutting benefits. Over the past 20 years, 
medical costs in workers' compensation have been rising rapidly. Workers' 
compensation systems can look for ways to reduce these costs without 
sacrificing the quality of care. We find evidence that managed care may 
reduce costs in workers' compensation, but mixed evidence about the success 
of fee schedules. Overall, research does not support the contention that 
employer choice of medical providers reduces medical costs, and virtually 
no research addresses how cost-control affects the quality of care and patient 
satisfaction. 
Litigation also can generate unnecessary costs. Workers' compensation sys-
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN THE U.S. 19 1  
tems were designed to replace common-law liability suits with systems that 
rendered attorney representation superfluous. However, data suggest that liti­
gation is a substantial and growing aspect of workers' compensation. We 
review evidence about the causes of litigation in workers' compensation. 
Finally, even in a cost-conscious environment, the adequacy and equity of 
workers' compensation systems remain important issues. We examine how 
benefits vary among states, among injuries of different severity, and among 
types of injuries and illnesses. We should find adequate replacement of lost 
earnings in these categories. Yet, the picture is far from ideal. Benefits vary 
greatly among states, and the most serious injuries and illnesses are the least 
well compensated. This finding supports the search for reforms that provide a 
better match between income losses and benefits. 
INCOME BENEFITS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Workers' compensation provides income benefits, medical payments, and 
rehabilitation payments to workers injured on the job and their families. In 
the United States, each state has its own system with its own statute, reg­
ulations, and administration. Federal systems cover federal employees, 
longshoremen and harbor workers, and workers employed in the District of 
Columbia. 
Besides benefits to families of fatally injured workers, workers' compensa­
tion pays four types of income benefits, distinguished by whether the worker's 
loss is temporary or permanent and whether the loss is partial or total. Tem­
porary total disability benefits cover income losses when injured workers are 
off work during their healing period. Temporary partial disability benefits 
cover income losses during the healing period when workers take lower-paying 
jobs or work part-time. 
Most injured workers fully recover from their injuries and return to their 
preinjury jobs. But some injured workers never completely recover: They 
remain permanently impaired. The American Medical Association defines 
impairment as "the loss of, loss of use of, or derangement of any body part, 
system, or function" ( 1 ,  p. 236). One possible consequence of impairment is 
disability, that is a reduction in the ability to earn wages. 
If a worker is deemed permanently unable to work, states pay permanent 
total disability benefits. State workers' compensation programs treat other 
injuries with permanent effects in different ways. Some states base benefits 
on impairment, providing permanent partial benefits based on an impairment 
rating, a measure of functional losses, between one to 100 percent. Other states 
use a disability rating, estimating loss of earning capacity, again as a percent­
age. Still other states use the difference between current earnings and preinjury 
earnings to calculate benefits; these are called wage-loss systems. 
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1 92 BODEN 
INJURY AND ILLNESS PREVENTION 
A principal stated goal of workers' compensation is influencing employers to 
provide safer working conditions. Given the limitations of regulatory enforce­
ment by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (67), 
workers' compensation has been suggested as an alternative to regulation. On 
the other hand, if both programs are very limited in their impacts, we should 
look to other approaches to provide the desired improvement in workplace 
safety (4, 14). 
In theory, workers' compensation provides safety incentives to employers 
because it requires them to pay substantial benefits to injured workers. Because 
injuries and illnesses are more expensive with workers' compensation than 
without, employers benefit more from safety activities and, in theory, invest 
more in hazard reduction, decreasing the number of occupational injuries and 
illnesses. The extent of these impacts depends on several factors. 
Factors Affecting Safety Incentives 
SELF-INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING Russell (67) pointed out that in­
surance arrangements can attenuate the relationship between benefit payments 
and the employer's costs, diluting safety incentives. The premiums of very 
large employers closely reflect recent injury costs through self-insurance 
(where the employer directly pays benefitsl or, when they purchase insurance, 
experience rating or retrospective rating (33, 73). Yet, the sensitivity of 
premiums to injury costs varies inversely with size, and the smallest employers 
pay a fixed premium that depends on their industry, but not on their own injury 
experience. If they improve safety, their premiums do not fall; and if they 
become less safe, their premiums do not rise. Because their costs are insensitive 
to benefit payments, workers' compensation provides minimal safety incen­
tives to smaller employers (67)-where most workers and most injuries occur. 
HAZARD WAGES Economists have suggested that without workers' compen­
sation employers still would pay at least part of the costs of occupational 
injuries, in the form of hazard wages. If workers are well informed and have 
choices between safer and less-safe jobs, they will demand hazard pay to work 
in less-safe jobs. Hazard wages reflect the risk of lost wages and medical 
expenses and in part cover the "pain and suffering" that accompany injuries 
and illnesses. 
Controlling for education, experience, and other labor-market charac­
teristics, research finds that workers receive hazard wages for safety risks 
IFor the rest of this review, "experience rating" will refer to any method of determining premiums 
based on past expereince. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN THE U.S. 193 
(44, 75). Yet this is not so for risks of chronic occupational diseases (7). 
And it is unlikely that hazard wages fully reflect the costs of injuries or 
illnesses. 
Where they are present, hazard wages provide incentives to employers to 
improve workplace safety. If employers improve safety, they can pay lower 
hazard wages, offsetting safety costs. 
But in some situations, the interaction of hazard wages and workers' com­
pensation coverage could reduce workplace safety (68). Without workers' 
compensation insurance, employers in dangerous industries might pay sub­
stantial hazard wages, providing incentives to improve safety. Workers' com­
pensation covers much of workers' out-of-pocket injury costs, reducing their 
demand for hazard wages, and making the employer's wage costs less respon­
sive to injury rates (73, 76). Workers' compensation premiums of smaller 
employers are insensitive to injury rates, so their overall incentive to invest in 
safety declines. 
PROBABILITY OF COMPENSATION If workers' compensation is to provide fi­
nancial incentives to eliminate hazards, employers must pay benefits when 
workers become sick or injured. This is a reasonable assumption for most 
workplace injuries. However, few cases of chronic occupational diseases are 
compensated (19, 36). When compensation is paid, it is long after exposure, 
and the responsible managt!rs are unlikely to be held accountable (40). In this 
case, safety incentives cannot be substantial. 
Evidence about Safety Impacts of Workers' Compensation 
INCOME BENEFITS AND SAFETY Table 1 summarizes sixteen studies of the 
impact of workers' compensation on safety.2 These studies generally focus on 
income benefit levels. As benefit levels rise, workers' compensation payments 
per injury rise. Employers' costs become more responsive to injury rates, 
providing an additional incentive to improve safety conditions. Most studies 
find that reported injuries increase or remain unchanged when benefit levels 
rise. 
The studies use diverse data sources and methods. Nine of the sixteen studies 
in Table 1 rely on injury data collected by or reportable to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labor. Employers report annually 
the total number of injuries and the number of injuries involving one or more 
days lost from work. Four of the studies use workers' compensation claim data 
to measure safety. Two rely on self-reported workers' compensation claim 
information, one from the Current Population Survey and one from the Panel 
2This review focuses on injury rates, not days lost from work, as the measure of safety. 
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Table I Studies of the impact of workers' compensation on injuries 
How employer size 
Measure of workers' Association of higher affects the impact of 
Injury measure Source of data Unit of observation compensation benefits benefits to injury rates benefits on injury rates 
Study 
Chelius Injuries per 100 Injuries: BLS,' all Two-digit SIC' man- Estimate of average pro- (a) Frequency of in- Not tested 
(a) (29) full-time workers injuries and injur- ufacturing industries portion of wages re- juries rose, and 
(b) (30) ies with lost work- (a) in 36 states, placed in industry and lost-workday rate 
days per 100 full- 1972-75, 1482 state by temporary to- did not change (b) 
time workers observations (b) in tal disability benefits both rates increased 
28 states, 1972-78, 
1967 observations 
Butler (26) Workers' compensa- South Carolina labor South Carolina: 15 in- Average real annual in- Using a principal- Not tested 
tion claim rates in department and dustries, 1940-71, dernnity payments per components benefit 
South Carolina workers' com- 468 observations worker: temporary to- measure, all injury 
pensation agency tal, permanent partial, rates but temporary 
permanent total, and total increased 
fatality claims 
Butler & Rates of workers' National Council on 35 States, 1972-78 Average benefit per Injury rates generally 
Worrall compensation Compensation In- claim within each increased or did not 
(27) claims surance, temporary state for each type of change 
total, minor and claim 
major permanent 
partial claims 
Chelius & Difference between BLS, injuries with 15 Two-digit man- Temporary total disabil- 5 of 60 estimates Little or no impact 
Smith large and small lost workdays ufacturing industries ity statutory payment show significant detected 
(32) firms in injuries in 37 states, 1979, at industry average reductions at p < 
per 100 full-time 305 observations wage .05; 32 of 60 show 
workers, by in- reductions 
dustry 
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Robertson Number of injuries Three metal fabrica- Worker-years of expo- State maximum tempo- Injuries grew; effect Not tested 
& Keeve reportable to tion plants in three sure, by individual rary total disability stronger for sprains 
(62) BLS, number of states and department, rate and strains than for 
sprains and 2700 workers, "objective" injuries 
strains, and num- 1973-80 
ber of "objective" 
injuries 
Bartel & Injuries per 100 Injuries: BLS, injur- Three-digit SIC man- Expected benefit per Injury rate increased; Not tested 
Thomas full-time workers ies with lost work- ufacturing, averaged claim for each tbree- but change not sig-
(6) days Industries: over 22 states, digit industry nificant 
OSHA", BLS Em- 1972-78 
ployment and 
Earnings, Bureau 
of the Census 
Leigh (53) Individual's receipt Panel Study of In- 11,889 person-years, State's temporary total Probability of receiv- Not tested 
of workers' com- come Dynamics, interviewed in disability formula ap- ing benefits in-
pensation benefits 1977-79 1977-79 plied to worker's creased, but impact 
wage not significant 
Ruser (63) Injuries per 100 Injuries: BLS, non- 25 three-digit industr- Measure of average real Both total injuries and Increase in injury 
full-time workers fatal injuries with ies by state, 1972- temporary total dis- lost-workday injury rates smaller in lar-
lost workdays, all 79, 3243 observa- ability benefit paid, rates increased ger firms 
reported injuries tions using state wage dis-
Size: County Busi- tribution and benefit 
ness Patterns formula 
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. P
ub
lic
. H
ea
lth
. 1
99
5.
16
:1
89
-2
18
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 ar
jou
rna
ls.
an
nu
alr
ev
iew
s.o
rg
by
 B
os
to
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
n 
09
/0
8/
09
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Table 1 (Continued) 
How employer size 
Measure of workers' Association of higher affects the impact of 
Injury measure Source of data Unit of observation compensation benefits benefits to injury rates benefits on injury rates 
Chelius & Frequency of work- Workers' compensa- 24 quarters at each of Temporary disability Rates for both types Self-insurance associ-
Kava- ers' compensation tion claim files of two colleges, 1978- benefit levels of in juries were ated with fewer 
naugh claims with lost two community 84 higher before bene- accepted workers' 
(31) time and of colleges in New fits cut by 30% compensation 
claims with more Jersey claims 
than seven days' 
lost time 
Worrall & Workers' compensa- South Carolina labor South Carolina: 15 in- Expected workers' com- Permanent partial Impact on permanent 
Butler tion claim rates in department and dustries, 1940-71, pensation benefits for rates rose; other partial rates lower 
(79) South Carolina: workers' com- 468 observations the average worker rates rose, but not in industries with 
temporary total, pensation agency significantly larger average em-
permanent partial, ployment; impact 
and all claims on other rates low-
with income ben- er, but not signifi-
efits cantly 
Moore & Fatalities per Injuries: NIOSH Injuries: 7 one-digit State maximum tempo- Fatality rates fell Reduction in fatality 
Viscusi 100,000 workers National Traumatic industries by state, rary total disability rates greater in 
(55) Occupational 1980-84 rate larger fmns (signi-
Fatality sur- Firm size: Census, ficant in three of 
veillance system one-digit industries four specifications) 
Individuals: Panel by state, 1982 
Study of Income Other data: 1173 in-
Dynamics dividuals, 1982 
Krueger Probability of filing Current Population 19,082 individuals, State maximum tempo- Probability of filing Not tested 
(52) a workers' com- Survey 1984-85 rary total disability increased 
pensation daim rate 
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Ruser Injuries per 1 00  Ca) BLS, injuries Ca) 2788 (b) 2798 (a) State maximum tem- (a) Rates generally (a) Greatest increase 
(a) 64 full-time workers with lost workdays manufacturing es- porary total disability increased (b) Rates in smallest work-
(b) 65 Cb) BLS, injuries at tablishments, 1979- rate C b) Estimate of declined for fatal places, no increase 
four levels of 84, (a) 1 6,728 (b) average proportion of injuries, but in- in largest (b) For 
severity 16,788 observations wages replaced by creased for others injuries with and 
Ca) and (b) BLS Cur- temporary total dis- without lost work-
rent Employment ability benefits days, larger in-
Survey, other data crease in smaller 
workplaces; no size 
impact for fatal in-
juries 
Chelius & Injuries per 100 BLS, injuries with Washington vs. other Not used Not tested Experience-rating of 
Smith full-time workers lost workdays states, 1979-8 1, by small firms i n  
(34) three-digit SIC and Washington did not 
7 size classes reduce their injury 
rates relative to 
large firms 
'BLS: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, SIC: Standard Industrial Classification, OSHA: US Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
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198 BODEN 
Study of Income Dynamics. Another study uses data from the National Trau­
matic Occupational Fatality surveillance system (50), which is based on death 
certificates. 
Most of the studies are ecological, relying on average injury rates by state 
(27), by industry (6), by industry within a state (26, 79), or by industry and 
state (29, 30, 32, 34, 63). Three examined injury rates by workplace (31, 64, 
65), one used injury data by state and industry, attributing these risks to 
individuals (55), while three others used data on individuals (52, 53, 62). Most 
of the studies use least squares regression to fit the data, although one (52) 
uses probit estimates. One author, Ruser (63-65), uses methods designed for 
count data (number of injuries). 
Only one of the nine studies using BLS injury rates (64) found an i.nverse 
relationship between injury rates and benefit levels. The six studies in Table 
1 using workers' compensation claim rates all failed to show a safety impact 
of benefit levels. Two studies, using data on individuals, also could not find 
a safety impact (52, 53). In fact, these studies generally found that injury rates 
rose when benefits increased. 
Because these studies rely on reported injuries, we cannot draw the firm 
conclusion that higher benefits lead to less-safe working conditions. This is 
because benefit levels affect injury reporting. When benefit levels rise and 
paying benefits becomes more expensive, we expect employers to discourage 
the filing of workers' compensation claims more frequently and to encourage 
earlier return to work (3 1, 68). At the same time, workers lose less income if 
they miss work, so they may report more injuries and stay off work longer 
(45, 46). Even if injury rates fell as benefits rose, reported injury rates might 
rise. 
EXPERIENCE RATING, SELF-INSURANCE, AND SAFETY Recognizing this ambi­
guity, some researchers have looked for ways to minimize the impact of 
reporting on measures of the safety impact of workers' compensation. One 
method compares the effect of benefits on injuries among employer-size 
groups, looking for an "experience-rating" effect. 
The impact of benefit changes on workers' incentives to report injuries 
should be similar in smaller and larger firms. Small firms are not experience 
rated, and thus lack incentives to improve safety when benefits arise. Differ­
ences in the response of small and large firms to benefit changes thus should 
reflect the impact of benefits on injury rates for large firms. As benefits rise, 
we expect to find that injury rates in large firms decline relative to those in 
small firms. 
Two studies by Chelius & Smith did not find an experience-rating effect 
(32, 34). On the other hand, studies by Worrall & Butler (79), Moore & Viscusi 
(55), and Ruser (63, 64) found experience-ratings effects. As benefits rose, 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN THE U.S. 199 
injury rates in large finns fell relative to those in small finns. Ruser's most 
recent study (65) had similar findings for nonfatal injuries with lost workdays 
and for injuries without lost workdays. However, he did not find an employ­
ment-size relationship for fatal injury rates. 
A related study suggests that the measured impact of experience-rating on 
safety could reflect reporting changes by employers and not real changes in 
injury rates (3 1). Two community colleges more aggressively challenged the 
compensability of claims after switching to self-insurance. Self-insurance tied 
workers' compensation costs more closely to injury costs, leading employers 
to report fewer injuries. Similarly, when benefits rise, experience-rated em­
ployers may discourage claim-filing and reject more workers' compensation 
claims. Spieler (69) notes that, if employers initiate aggressive loss-control 
programs, injured workers may fear retaliation and avoid filing injury claims. 
Rising costs also may cause employers to institute safety contests with group 
rewards for injury-free periods. Pressure from fellow workers may then de­
crease reporting by injured workers. Other studies also have found that finan­
cial incentives affect employer reporting of injuries (66) and hazardous 
conditions ( 16). Employers who deny workers' compensation claims also are 
unlikely to report the injuries to the BLS. 
EVIDENCE FROM "OBJECTIVE" INJURIES To control for reporting bias, some 
studies focus on injury types that are less likely to be subject to systematic 
reporting bias. Robertson & Keeve (62) compared the impact of benefit levels 
on sprains and strains to the impact on more "objective" injuries, like lacera­
tions and fractures. They found, in both cases, that reported injuries increased 
with increasing benefits, although the effect was stronger for sprains and 
strains. 
Other researchers have used a similar approach, focusing on fatalities­
clear-cut events, and injured workers are unlikely to overreport them. Still, 
Butler (26) estimated benefit impacts on fatal injury rates and found that benefit 
increases were associated with higher fatality rates. On the other hand, Moore 
& Viscusi (55) and Ruser (65) concluded that increases in workers' compen­
sation benefits reduced fatality rates. Moore & Viscusi used a measure of injury 
rates only at a very aggregated (one-digit) industry level. Also, in Ruser's 1993 
study, the estimated impact on fatalities did not decline with employment size 
(65). This is inconsistent with experience-rating and self-insurance as mecha­
nisms that presumably generate safety incentives. If these function as expected, 
the sensitivity of premiums to injury experience should increase with size. 
Few studies have found evidence for a safety effect, and, where such evi­
dence exists, it can be explained by incentives for employers to discourage 
and contest expensive injuries. In all the studies to date, the investigators did 
not control the collection of injury data and thus could not distinguish safety 
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200 BODEN 
effects from reporting effects. Attempts to control statistically for reporting 
bias have had only limited success. 
Despite many studies addressing this question, we cannot be confident that 
workers' compensation reduces injury rates, even for large experience-rated 
or self-insured firms. This is puzzling, since workers' compensation has be­
come a significant and growing business cost. Several studies provide evidence 
that organizational and managerial shortcomings block employers from taking 
action that would be in their self-interest. A survey of employers suggests that 
they rarely know the size of their workers' compensation premiums (49). 
Another study showed that risk managers and engineering departments com­
municated poorly (40). Sometimes, large companies may treat workers' com­
pensation costs as fixed overhead. Employers may assume that "accident­
prone" workers cause injuries or that many reported injuries are fraudulent 
(69). Still, ignorance and inefficient behavior are less than satisfactory expla­
nations of the limited impact of workers' compensation on safety behavior. 
Perhaps further study will conclude that the net financial incentives of workers' 
compensation costs are smaller than we believe them to be. 
MEDICAL CARE AND MEDICAL COSTS 
Despite the widespread interest in the cost and quality of medical care, re­
searchers only recently have begun to study this issue in the workers' com­
pensation setting. Studies of medical care in other settings have relevance to 
workers' compensation, but some distinctive features suggest that behavior in 
workers' compensation may be quite different. In workers' compensation: 
• Medical care is fully covered; deductibles and copayments cannot be used 
to control utilization. 
• The employer or insurer pays both income and medical benefits. 
• Physicians often provide information that determines income benefits, in­
cluding whether an injury is compensable when a worker is ready to return 
to work, and assessments of permanent impairment. 
• Because of the physician's role in determining income benefits, patient­
physician communication may be impaired, affecting the quality of care. 
• Some injuries are litigated, which can interfere with medical treatment. 
Workers' Compensation Medical Costs 
From 1980 to 1985, workers' compensation medical costs rose at an average 
annual rate of 14.7 percent, compared to an annual increase of 9.8 percent 
outside workers' compensation (15, 17). Between 1985 and 1990, this trend 
continued (70). 
A study of medical costs in Minnesota provides additional evidence that 
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workers' compensation medical costs are higher than nonworkers' compensa­
tion costs. It analyzed a matched sample of claims from Minnesota's largest 
workers' compensation insurer and major nonworkers' compensation insurer 
(71). Workers' compensation treatment averaged 2.4 times as expensive as 
nonworkers' compensation treatment. Using regression analysis to control for 
the quantity of medical services used, workers' compensation charges re­
mained over twice those outside workers' compensation. A reanalysis of these 
data came to the same conclusion and found charges for specific services to 
be higher in workers' compensation (5). This suggests that prices, not utiliza­
tion, caused most of the disparities in costs between the two systems. 
Another study reported substantially higher medical costs in workers' com­
pensation claims than in group health claims (37). This study of claims from 
Florida, Illinois, Oregon, and Pennsylvania analyzed treatment costs, using 
regression analysis to control for state, year, diagnosis, and cost-containment 
controls used in workers' compensation. It found workers' compensation costs 
between 1.65 and 2.3 times group health costs. Controlling further for provider 
mix, number of outpatient service dates, and length of hospital stays, the 
difference between workers' compensation and group health disappeared. 
From this, the authors concluded that the differences between workers' com­
pensation and group health costs were caused by greater utilization of medical 
services and not by higher prices. 
Controlling for gender, age, utilization measures, case mix, and severity, 
another study estimated that workers' compensation prices in California were 
25 percent below nonworkers' compensation prices (59). Nevertheless, 
workers' compensation medical costs per episode averaged 21 percent higher 
than group medical costs after adjusting for case mix, which suggests that 
higher utilization caused the difference in overall costs. The stringent workers' 
compensation fee schedule in effect in California may in part explain why 
workers' compensation prices there are lower than group health prices. 
While the three studies disagree about the relative importance of prices and 
utilization, they agree that workers' compensation medical care is much more 
expensive. 
Workers' Compensation Medical Cost Control 
Over the past several years, many states have adopted one or more methods 
of containing medical costs. In the year before July 1, 1991, 15 states added 
one or more new cost-containment initiatives or were developing them ( 18). 
In the next 15 months, 19 states had added or were developing additional 
cost-containment activities (70). 
CHOICE OF PROVIDER Employers and insurers support employer choice of 
medical provider and managed care to achieve control over medical-care costs. 
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Organized labor, on the other hand, supports control over medical care by the 
injured worker. Each side has argued that its preferred option is more effective 
in producing high-quality care and low costs. 
A 1989 report of preliminary results (35) found higher medical costs among 
states that allowed workers to choose their own medical providers. In another 
(74), Victor & Fleischman reported that changes to employee choice in Illinois 
and Texas led to increased medical costs. 
Several studies, however, have come to the opposite conclusion. One (17) 
looked at eight states that changed their laws about provider choice during the 
1965-1985 period. Except for one state, Illinois, no major changes in medical 
cost growth occurred when states changed their laws regarding provider choice. 
Pozzebon (60, 6 1) found that, controlling for other factors, states limiting 
employee choice of provider had average medical payments 10 to 15 percent 
higher than other states. A study by Appel & Durbin found analogous results. 
In states with employee choice of provider, claims tended to be considerably 
shorter and thus less costly (2). 
The debate about this issue transcends interest in containing medical costs 
(42, 43). When they choose the medical provider, employers and insurers have 
a greater say about the provider's behavior in litigated cases. In many workers' 
compensation systems, treating providers furnish information about when a 
worker is ready to return to work (and temporary disability benefits may be 
terminated) or the worker's level of impairment (affecting permanent disability 
benefits). Because provider choice can affect income benefits, it would be in 
contention even if everybody agreed it had no impact on medical costs. 
MEDICAL FEE SCHEDULES The use of medical fee schedules in workers' com­
pensation has engendered less controversy. Yet evidence of effectiveness is 
also in dispute. Preliminary results cited above (35), Borba (21), and Levy & 
Miller (54) all found lower medical costs among states with fee schedules. 
However, another study showed that, in 1980-1985, there was no correlation 
between the growth of medical costs and the use of medical fee schedules ( 17). 
Controlling for other factors, Pozzebon did not find that average growth rates 
of medical costs in fee-schedule states were lower than in other states during 
1979-1987 (60, 61). 
Another study of workers' compensation fee schedules helps to explain these 
seemingly inconsistent results. This study (41) found substantial variability 
among states in the stringency and coverage of medical fee schedules, sug­
gesting that we should not expect similar effects from all fee schedules. In the 
four most restrictive states, fee-schedule limits averaged between 54 and 64 
percent of nonworkers' compensation medical charges in 1992. In the four 
least restrictive states, they averaged 103 to 112 percent of nonworkers' com­
pensation charges. If a fee schedule allows fees above typical charges, it does 
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not constrain medical costs. In fact, providers billing below the fee schedule 
may use it as a signal to raise fees. The study also found that the percentage 
of workers' compensation charges covered by fee schedules varied from a low 
of 57.5 percent to a high of 100 percent (41). 
MANAGED CARE In recent years, states have begun to look to managed care 
to reduce workers' compensation medical costs. Oregon undertook the earli­
est and most extensive move in this direction in 1991. If an employer in 
Oregon has designated an approved managed-care organization, Oregon 
requires injured workers to receive medical care from the managed-care 
organization in most circumstances. In 1992, Minnesota established a similar 
program, and the legislature in North Dakota required its exclusive state 
fund to establish a managed-care program. The legislatures in Montana 
and Ohio enacted laws in 1993 to require copayments from workers who 
elect to receive treatment outside designated managed-care organizations. 
These states previously allowed injured workers the initial choice of med­
ical provider. 
Despite this growing activity, little research has assessed the impact of 
managed care on workers' compensation costs. A 1991 study compared the 
workers' compensation experience of postal employees in Massachusetts en­
rolled in a health maintenance organization (HMO) with those in a fee-for­
service plan (80). It found lower medical payments and somewhat lower 
income benefits among the HMO enrollees. Using analysis of variance to 
control for age, job category, and injury type, the reduction in medical costs 
was significant (p.<05). 
The HMO was paid on a fee-for-service basis for workers' compensation 
injuries. Still, providers at the HMO continued to give lower-cost care than 
their fee-for-service counterparts. This suggests that the more cost-conscious 
practice style of the HMO carried over to the fee-for-service workers' com­
pensation services. Additional fees for workers' compensation services in­
creased the income of the HMO, so this arrangement provided incentives 
to maximize the number of conditions classified as work related (39). Yet 
workers' compensation claim rates were slightly lower among the fee-for-ser­
vice enrollees. Organizational financial incentives did not affect the behavior 
of the HMO's providers. 
A pilot program providing workers' compensation managed care to state 
government employees in south Florida also appears to have reduced medical 
costs. Beginning in 1991, the State of Florida paid a fixed monthly premium 
per enrolled worker to an HMO providing workers' compensation medical 
care. Costs were tracked, and the state and the HMO shared equally in any 
surplus or deficit, providing the HMO an incentive to reduce costs. 
An evaluation (3) compared payments to the HMO with those to fee-for-
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service providers3. Medical payments were almost 60 percent lower in the 
HMO group. Accounting for HMO administrative fees and controlling for 
differences in demographic and injury characteristics, savings remained close 
to 50 percent. Payments of income benefits also were reduced substantially. 
Consistent with other research on HMOs, hospital costs were reduced more 
than physician costs. 
The authors caution against generalizing from their findings. The pilot nature 
of this study may have induced a "Hawthorne effect," leading the HMO to 
watch costs more carefully than it might if providing ongoing care. Also, south 
Florida is an area of high medical costs, possibly with more leeway to generate 
savings than other areas. 
We draw the tentative conclusion that managed care in workers' compen­
sation can achieve substantial cost-savings. More research in different settings 
and over longer periods will clarify the size of these savings. 
Medical Care Quality and Patient Satisfaction 
Few studies address the public health and labor union concerns about the 
noncost implications of medical cost controls. Two exceptions highlight the 
importance of these issues. The Florida pilot study included a survey of 
workers' satisfaction with their medical care. The respondents in the HMO 
program were less satisfied than the fee-for-service control group with their 
doctor's treatment, the medical tests they were given, and the appointment 
scheduling (3). The response rate to this survey was only 23 per cent. 
Another study shows that reducing medical care for injured workers delays 
return to work and increases income losses (38). This implies that single­
minded attention to medical costs is misplaced. How cost-control methods 
affect outcomes remains an important question. 
National Health Reform and Workers' Compensation 
The discussion about reform of the US health care system has engendered a 
debate over the relationship of workers' compensation to general health care. 
Much of this debate centers on whether integration of workers' compensation 
medical care into the general health care delivery system would increase or 
decrease costs. Baker & Krueger (5) reanalyzed the Minnesota data described 
above (7 1 ), and they come to the same conclusion-that workers' compensa­
tion medical prices are more than twice prices outside workers' compensation. 
The authors suggest that shifting to an integrated system would eliminate price 
differences between the currently separate systems and thus reduce workers' 
compensation costs by half or more. They also suggest other, more speculative, 
3Florida also developed a second pilot using a preferred provider organization (PPO). This pilot 
used less-comparable groups, which made differences hard to interpret (3). 
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sources of savings, including easier use of managed care and utilization review, 
reduced administrative and legal costs, and less medical testing for legal 
purposes. 
Even in an integrated system, many important differences will remain. For 
example, litigation in workers' compensation will continue to complicate pa­
tient-physician communication, making treatment less effective and possibly 
more costly. Providers will still spend more time on workers' compensation 
claims because of special reporting requirements, and they will test more often 
to provide information needed to determine compensability or the level of 
income benefits. And, finally, it is very unlikely that copayments and deduct­
ibles will be introduced into workers' compensation. We cannot therefore 
expect the entire difference in costs to evaporate in an integrated system. 
Grannemann & Victor (48) have pointed out that integrated systems would 
separate responsibility for paying income and medical benefits. They note that 
medical providers in health plans, chosen by workers, may lean toward allow­
ing workers more time off than would providers chosen by employers or 
insurers. Of course, this would only be relevant in the states that now restrict 
the worker' s choice of provider. Another concern is that capitated medical-care 
plans, intent on holding down medical costs, might forgo medical treatment 
that would accelerate return to work. This might harm both the worker and 
the employer. Of course, it is also possible that capitated plans or standardized 
treatment protocols might eliminate unnecessary and expensive procedures 
that both increase medical costs and delay return to work. 
Integration would affect the choice of provider, now governed by state 
workers' compensation laws. In employer-choice states; employers would lose 
some control over providers, while in employee-choice states the reverse would 
occur. Both sides understand that choosing the provider may give them added 
say in medical decisions that affect nonmedical outcomes-in particular, in­
come benefits to injured workers. The AFL-CIO has supported integration, 
viewing it as more like employee choice than employer choice (42, 43). Also, 
integration might block the move in some "employee-choice" states to work­
ers' compensation managed-care organizations chosen by employers and in­
surers. 
Finally, integration of workers' compensation medical care into a national 
health care system offers unique opportunities to provide improved surveil­
lance of occupational injury and illness and data for research on medical care 
in workers' compensation. Currently, there is little standardization of medical 
data in workers' compensation. A national, integrated system could require 
standard billing forms, including uniformly coded information on occupation, 
industry, employer, diagnosis, and procedure. To the extent possible, these 
could be stored electronically, rather than on paper. Analyses of these data 
could identify industries where workers face excess risks. They also could 
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provide data to compare prices and utilization in and outside workers' com­
pensation. 
LITIGATION 
Before workers' compensation, injured workers and their families generally 
bore the costs of their work-related injuries. To get compensation, workers 
had the difficult task of proving in a court of law that employer negligence 
caused their injuries. If workers won negligence suits, payments were made 
long after they were injured, and a large amount of each settlement was diverted 
for legal fees. Today, workers with minor injuries covered by workers' com­
pensation generally can expect to receive payments promptly and without 
contest. Less than 10 percent of claims for occupational injuries are contested. 
Causes and Effects of Litigation 
Employers and insurers can contest workers' compensation claims because 
they do not consider the injury to be work-related, for example, or because 
the workers want greater benefits than the employers or insurers are willing 
to pay. In most injury cases the employer or insurance carrier has little incentive 
to contest because proof of eligibility is easy, and the potential gain to the 
insurer of postponing or eliminating small payments is not enough to offset 
the legal costs of pursuing a claim. 
For expensive injury claims like permanent disability and death claims, 
insurance companies are much more likely to deny claims or contest benefits. 
Workers, through their attorneys, more frequently maintain that they deserve 
additional benefits. In most states, claims for permanent disability and death 
are litigated more than half the time, compared to less than 5 percent of claims 
for temporary disability (56). Employers and insurers also contest claims for 
chronic occupational disease and cumulative trauma much more frequently 
than claims for injuries (8, 12, 19). 
Studies of litigation of permanent partial disability low-back injuries have 
shown that states vary considerably in how frequently these claims are litigated. 
In Maryland and New Jersey, workers retain attorneys in more than 90 percent 
of these claims. However, attorney representation in Oregon and Wisconsin is 
much less common (20). Information from workers' compensation insurers 
shows considerable variation among states in attorney involvement, and also 
suggests that litigation became more frequent during the 1980s (Table 2) (56). 
Litigation imposes substantial costs on injured workers, employers, 'and 
insurers, and administrative costs on workers' compensation systems. In liti­
gated permanent disability claims, these added costs absorb about one third of 
income benefits (13). Savings from reducing litigation could be used to im­
prove benefits for injured workers or to reduce insurance premiums paid by 
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Table 2 Litigation rate, claims with in-
come benefits, insured employers 
Percent of claims with 
attorney involvement 
1980 1985 1989 
State 
Florida 6.9 8.2 16.0 
Georgia 9.5 14.9 27.6 
Illinois 23.1 23.8 29.5 
Kentucky 11.9 10.7 12.0 
Maine 14.1 17.1 12.7 
Massachusetts 11.3 14.4 20.5 
Michigan 23.8 15.0 8.8 
Minnesota 4.5 7.6 7.3 
Pennsylvania 3.1 4.3 5.2 
Average 12.1 13.0 17.1 
Source.' National Council on Compensation In-
surance (56) 
employers. Litigation also delays the delivery of benefits, often by more than 
a year. 
System and Insurer Factors Affecting Litigation 
Studies of permanently disabling back injuries in two litigious states and two 
less-litigious states identified features that can cause high litigation rates (20). 
Laws and regulations in the litigious states do not provide clear guidance about 
benefits owed to injured workers. Workers' compensation agencies in these 
states do not provide injured workers with information about the benefits they 
are entitled to, and they do not ensure that insurers and employers pay perma­
nent partial disability benefits in a timely manner. Also, if claims are litigated, 
adjudicators tend to "split the difference" between disparate medical assess­
ments by defense and claimant experts. In these states, attorneys provide 
workers with valuable information and services. Without opinions from phy­
sicians chosen by their attorneys, injured workers must rely only on the as­
sessments of partisan defense physicians, accepting a lower payment-or none 
at all. 
Less-litigious systems provide employers and insurers with reasonable cer­
tainty about what they owe and provide injured workers with information about 
the benefits they should receive. Practices and rules encourage the use of 
nonpartisan experts, typically treating physicians, in the evaluation process. 
With more than one physician opinion, adjudicators do not split the difference, 
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typically relying on the treating physician's opinion. Also, the workers' com­
pensation agency provides infonnation to injured workers and ensures that 
insurers and employers pay pennanent partial disability benefits on time. When 
insurers and employers make timely payments of amounts that workers expect, 
workers feel well treated and their cases are resolved promptly and without 
litigation. 
Another study, based on surveys of workers with pennanent disabilities in 
California, provides complementary infonnation about how insurance com­
pany behavior can affect the propensity of workers to hire attorneys (22). Using 
probit regression, this study estimated the impact of injury characteristics, 
worker characteristics, benefits, and perceptions of insurer behavior on attor­
ney representation. It found that when workers believed that the insurer kept 
them well infonned or were satisfied with the insurers' overall handling of the 
claim, they were much less likely than otherwise to hire an attorney. Still, from 
these data, we cannot tell to what extent workers' satisfaction reflected insurer 
behavior or workers' attitudes. 
These studies suggest that states can design workers' compensation systems 
to provide an environment that reduces litigation withoutjeopardizing the­
protection that attorneys affQ[d injured workers. 
INCOME BENEFITS UNDER WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION 
Separate workers' compensation systems in fifty states, the District of Colum­
bia, and two federal jurisdictions have established their own benefit structures. 
Injured workers should face similar benefits wherever they are injured. Yet 
statutory income benefits vary considerably, suggesting that identical workers 
with identical injuries can expect to receive different benefits in different 
jurisdictions. 
After comparing overall benefits among jurisdictions, we tum to measures 
of benefit adequacy for the two most common types of injuries involving lost 
earnings: temporary total and pennanent partial disabilities. For each, we 
review knowledge about the proportion of lost income replaced by workers' 
compensation benefits. For temporary disabilities, some states are more gen­
erous than others, but workers receiving workers' compensation income ben­
efits typically recover between 80 and 100 percent of after-tax lost earnings. 
We use after-tax earnings because neither state nor federal income taxes apply 
to workers' compensation income benefits. Studies.of replacement rates for 
pennanently disabling injuries show that, on average, workers' compensation 
replaces a small proportion of earnings losses of pennanently disabled workers. 
Some also raise the possibility that, among workers with permanent earnings 
losses, permanent disability benefits are distributed inequitably. 
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Table 3 Maximum weekly benefits for total disability: selected states (on January I ,  1994) 
Jurisdiction Fraction of workers' wage Maximum weekly benefit 
Arizona 2/3 328 
Arkansas 2/3 267 (70% of SA WW) 
California 2/3 366 
Connecticut 3/4 of after-tax income 638 (SAWW) 
Florida 2/3 444 (SAWW) 
Georgia 2/3 250 
Indiana 2/3 394 
Iowa 4/5 of spendable earnings 797 (200% of SA WW) 
Kentucky 2/3 394 (SAWW) 
Louisiana 2/3 319 (75% of SAWW) 
Michigan 4/5 of spendable earnings 441 (90% of SA WW) 
Minnesota 2/3 508 (105% of SA WW) 
Mississippi 2/3 244 (213 of SA WW) 
North Carolina 2/3 466 (110% of SA WW) 
Ohio 72% first 12 weeks, then 2/3 482 (SAWW) 
Oklahoma 7/10 307 (3/4 of SA WW) 
Oregon 2/3 479 (SAWW) 
Pennsylvania 2/3 493 (SAWW) 
Tennessee 2/3 356 (82% of SA WW) 
Texas 7/10 466 (SAWW) 
Washington 6110 to 314" 517 (105% of SAWW) 
West Virginia 7/10 420 (SAWW) 
a Lower proportion if no dependents. 
Key: SAWW = State's  average weekly wage; NAWW = national average weekly wage. 
Source: US Chamber of Commerce. (72). 
Interstate Variation in Benefit Payments 
Workers' compensation is a state program, and benefits differ substantially 
from state to state. One commonly used measure of benefit levels is the 
maximum weekly rate for temporary total disability (Table 3). Temporary 
disability benefits are calculated as a proportion (usually two thirds) of the 
worker's preinjury wage, up to a maximum weekly amount. By this measure, 
states exhibit considerable variation. In 1994, the lowest maximum weekly 
temporary disability benefits ($244 in Mississippi) were less than one third 
those in the most generous state ($797 in Iowa) (72). Statutory benefits for 
permanent disability exhibit similar variation. 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows a broad measure of benefit levels, average 
workers' compensation benefits paid per worker annually (25). Benefits per 
worker range from a low of $ 1 77 in Indiana to a high of $7 1 2  in West Virginia. 
This measure captures variation in benefit levels, wage levels and injury 
frequency, and injury severity. Column 3 shows workers' compensation ben-
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Table 4 Workers' compensation benefits paid in 1990, insured employers 
Average benefits paid 
per covered worker: Benefits as a percentage Ratio of 
1990 of wages benefits paid 
As a per- As a per- to lost wagesb 
cent of As a per- cent of Lost- As a percent 
Dollar median cent in median workday of median 
amount state state state rate" state 
I .  2 .  3 .  4 .  5 .  6 .  
State 
Arizona 3 1 4  89 1 .50 87 68.0 107 
Arkansas 3 1 1  88 1 .75 102 88.7 96 
California 494 140 1 .92 1 12 90.7 103 
Connecticut 502 142 1 .72 100 83.8 100 
Florida 468 133 2 .29 1 33 66.7 167 
Indiana 177 50 0.82 48 76.0 53 
Iowa 214 61  1 . 13 66 94.2 58 
Kentucky 340 96 1 .72 100 98.8  85 
Louisiana 530 1 50 2 .54 148 92.9 1 33 
Michigan 353 100 1 .38 80 109.9 6 1  
Minnesota 3 1 8  90 1 .39 8 1  79.9 85 
North Carolina 179 5 1  0.91  53 62.5 7 1  
Oklahoma 436 1 24 2. 17 126 9 1 .0 1 16 
Oregon 5 1 5  146 2.46 143 98.5 122 
Tennessee 304 86 1 .5 1  88 76.4 96 
Texas 645 1 83 2.84 165 1 15 .5  120 
West Virginia 7 1 2  202 3 .45 201 105.4 159 
Median state 353 100 1 .72 100 90.7 100 
Data in columns 1-4 from Burton & Schmidle (25) . 
• Calculated from data in columns 1 and 3 and lost workdays per 100 full-time equivalent workers; lost-workday data 
supplied to the author by Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor. 
b This rough approximation is calculated by the author, under the assumption of a 2oo-day work year as: 
(benefits/wages)/(annual lost workdays per worker/2oo). 
efits as a proportion of covered wages. To facilitate comparison, this measure 
is presented as a proportion of the value for the median state in Column 4. 
Finally, Column 6 shows an estimate of benefits paid per dollar of lost wages­
also as a proportion of the value for the median state. This measure is closest 
to a replacement rate, although it includes both medical and income benefits. 
It probably overestimates generosity in states with a greater proportion of 
severe injuries, because the lost-workday rate underestimates losses for severe 
injuries. Still, by this measure, the highest-benefit state is three times as 
generous as the lowest-benefit state. 
Rankings of states vary for the different measures in Table 4, but they are 
quite different from those in Table 3. The two states with the highest maximum 
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temporary disability rate are Iowa and Connecticut, but Iowa is very low and 
Connecticut is the median state based on the ratio of benefits paid to lost wages. 
Florida and Louisiana, the median states by temporary disability rate, are two 
of the highest using the ratio of benefits to lost wages. 
Statutory benefit rates are not the only factors affecting the level of income 
replacement. States can vary in the probability that injured workers will be 
compensated, the typical duration of temporary disability benefits for similar 
injuries, or the probability that workers with similar injuries will receive 
permanent disability benefits, or the degree of permanent disability assigned 
to similar injuries. 
We know that states vary widely in their propensity to pay permanent 
disability benefits. In recent years, 43 percent of compensated workers in 
California and 52 percent in Oklahoma received these benefits. In Alabama 
and Wisconsin, this proportion was 16 and 1 5  percent, respectively (57). If 
these states, all of which had three-day waiting periods, had similar distribu­
tions of injury severity, disparities would reflect the relative difficulty of 
qualifying for permanent disability benefits in Alabama and Wisconsin4• 
This considerable variation raises questions about the adequacy of benefits 
in different jurisdictions. None of the statistics presented above directly ad­
dresses this question, and only a few studies have done so. These studies have 
attempted to measure the replacement rate, the ratio of income benefits re­
ceived by workers to their economic losses. Some have examined replacement 
rates for injuries involving only temporary total disability. Others have esti­
mated replacement rates for the largest group of severe injuries, those involving 
permanent partial disability benefits. 
Ideally, each study should address several important substantive aspects of 
the replacement rate. First, because workers' compensation income benefits 
are not taxed, the replacement rate should compare after-tax income losses 
with workers' compensation benefits. Second, lost income should include the 
value of fringe benefits foregone. For injuries involving permanent partial 
disability, estimates of lifetime earnings should be compared with estimates 
of lifetime benefits. Where possible, income benefits should be calculated net 
of litigation costs paid by the worker. 
Studies have met these criteria to varying degrees, although none has ac­
counted for loss of fringe benefits. All the statistical studies suffer from another 
limitation: Their samples do not include workers with permanent earnings 
losses who received no permanent disability benefits. For this reason, they 
overestimate average replacement rates. 
4If time lost from work does not extend past a state's  waiting period, workers' compensation 
does not reimburse lost wages. States with longer waiting periods pay income benefits for fewer 
minor injuries. so lost-time injuries are more severe, on average. 
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Studies in this area indicate workers' compensation replaces a reasonable 
proportion of lost wages for most workers with minor, temporarily disabling 
injuries. But permanently disabled workers fare much less well. Average 
replacement rates for chronic occupational diseases are even lower than those 
for severe injuries. 
Replacement Rates for Temporary Total Disability 
In a series of studies of temporary total disability, the Workers' Compensation 
Research Institute (WCRI) has used a computer model to develop a distribution 
of after-tax replacement rates based on the applicable workers' compensation 
statute, the wage distribution of covered workers, and the applicable state and 
federal tax laws (9, 76). Calculated replacement rates assume that all injured 
workers receive the appropriate workers' compensation payments and that only 
work-related injuries are compensated. They do not consider the impact of the 
waiting period, which would reduce the average replacement rate. 
These studies conclude that temporary total disability benefits typically 
replaced between 80 and 100 percent of preinjury after-tax earnings. Most 
states provided this level of benefits to between 70 and 85 percent of injured 
workers. Of 21  states listed in recent comparisons, the WCRI model estimates 
that only Pennsylvania had a replacement rate over 100 percent for more than 
25 percent of injured workers. Six of these 2 1  states (Arkansas, Georgia, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi. and Washington) had replacement rates below 
80 percent for more than 25 percent of injured workers. 
Replacement Rates for Permanent Partial Disability 
A primary goal of workers' compensation is providing adequate benefits to 
seriously injured workers. However, the most recent published studies of 
replacement rates for severely injured workers cover injuries that occurred 
more than 20 years ago. Despite the lack of recent data, the qualitative con­
clusions of this research probably remain true today. 
In a study of California workplace injuries during the 1 950s, Cheit found 
considerable variation in replacement rates (28). He estimated that more than 
half of these workers received permanent disability benefits without any per­
manent earnings losses. For workers who experienced permanent income 
losses, however, permanent partial disability benefits typically replaced only 
a small fraction. For workers with ratings under 70 percent, benefits typically 
replaced less than 10 percent of losses. Benefits covered 36 percent of losses 
for workers with the highest disability ratings. 
Berkowitz ( 10) calculated permanent partial disability benefits on the assump­
tion that workers declared 50 percent disabled actually lost half their post-injury 
lifetime earnings. Using statutory benefits in effect for 1972, Berkowitz calcu­
lated the proportion of income losses replaced by pennanent partial disability 
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benefits for a 35-year-old worker with average wages. For 29 jurisdictions, the 
pretax replacement rate ranged between 12.9 percent and 25.9 percent. 
Ginnold (47) studied workers in Wisconsin who had an occupational injury 
in 1968 resulting in permanent disability benefit payments. Permanent disabil­
ity benefits averaged 16.4 percent or 24.6 percent of lifetime earnings losses, 
using five percent and ten percent discount rates, respectively. 
In a study of people injured at work during 1968 in Florida, California, or 
Wisconsin, Berkowitz & Burton (1 1 )  calculated income benefits net of legal 
fees for 1968 through 1973. Pretax replacement rates in Wisconsin averaged 
75 percent. In Florida they averaged 59 percent, whereas in California they 
were only 46 percent. 
Replacement rates estimated by Berkowitz & Burton for permanently dis­
abling injuries for 1968 in Wisconsin are much higher than those derived by 
Ginnold. Average benefits paid in the two studies were similar, but Ginnold 
calculated much higher future earnings, and thus higher earnings losses. The 
primary difference between the two estimates appears to be that Berkowitz & 
Burton focused only on the six years after the injury, whereas Ginnold pro­
jected earnings losses (but not benefits, which are nearly all paid by six years 
after injury) to the expected working life of the injured workers. In this light, 
the Berkowitz & Burton approach appears to overstate the replacement rate 
substantially. 
Johnson et al (50) measured income replacement among workers with per­
manent impairment ratings of at least 10 percent. These workers were injured 
between 1968 and 1970 in California, Florida, New York, Washington, or 
Wisconsin. The authors calculated after-tax replacement rates, focusing on 
workers whose earnings losses were at least $5005• About one third of the 
injured workers in this study suffered earnings losses less than $500, averaging 
a $45 loss. This group received average benefits of $ 163. 
Overall, studies show that workers suffering large income losses have had 
little of their income losses replaced by workers' compensation. Still, two 
studies (28, 5 1 )  showed that some injured workers with little or no permanent 
income loss received permanent disability benefits. 
Workers' compensation almost certainly replaces an even smaller proportion 
of income losses for occupational diseases than for injuries. Occupational 
disease claims tend to be litigated more frequently, so legal costs (which the 
worker usually pays) are higher. This reduces the net benefit to the injured 
worker. Also, workers file claims for only a small proportion of occupational 
diseases. 
s-rhe authors expressed concern that losses less than $500 "may have been an artifact of the 
estimation methods" (5 1 ,  p. 1 09). One third of the sample had losses less than $500. In this group, 
losses averaged $45 and benefits averaged $163. 
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Many victims do not even suspect that their disease is job related. For those 
who do and wish to make a claim, the causal relationship between disease and 
workplace exposures may be very difficult to establish. A study of asbestos 
insulators who died of asbestos-related causes (19) showed that fewer than 
half of asbestos-related fatalities among insulation workers led to workers' 
compensation claims. Of those who filed claims, the pretax replacement rate 
was only 22 percent. Overall, the pretax replacement rate was 10 percent. 
Because asbestos is the best-known cause of occupational disease and these 
workers were members of an active and well-informed union, we can be sure 
that other occupational diseases enter the workers' compensation system much 
less frequently. A study of occupational disease in Washington and California 
revealed that workers' compensation claims were filed for only three percent 
of identified cases of occupational disease (36). 
CONCLUSION 
Although workers' compensation costs have risen dramatically in the past 
20 years, research has not found income benefits to be excessive. Despite 
considerable variation among states, studies suggest that replacement of lost 
income is low for many workers with serious occupational injuries and 
illnesses. This suggests that benefits for these injuries and illnesses should 
be improved, although additional research must verify the extent and nature 
of this problem. Current knowledge generally does not support a strategy of 
reducing workers' compensation costs by cutting benefits or limiting condi­
tions eligible for compensation. 
This .review has discussed three potential areas for reducing workers' com­
pensation costs to employers while raising benefits to workers: improving 
safety, containing medical costs, and reducing litigation. 
In theory, workers' compensation increases the costs to employers of injuries 
and so provides incentives for improving safety. Taken as a whole, however, 
research does not provide convincing evidence that workers' compensation 
reduces injury rates. Few studies found evidence for a safety effect, and, where 
such evidence exists, it .can be explained by incentives for employers to 
discourage and contest expensive injuries. Perhaps workers' compensation 
does affect safety, but, if so, its impacts are blurred, if not overwhelmed, by 
reporting bias. 
Moreover, unlike safety and health regulation, workers' compensation fo­
cuses the attention of employers on specific workers and their injuries. Em­
ployers and insurers typically see "loss control," not just injury control, as their 
objective. This can lead to employers discouraging workers' compensation 
claims, increased conflict between workers and employers over when workers 
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should return to work, and discrimination against workers perceived to be 
"injury prone" (despite the strictures of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
This does not imply that we cannot reduce workers' compensation costs 
through better safety performance. It only suggests that workers' compensation 
premiums have limited value as weapons in the safety arsenal. 
Perhaps in response to these limitations, we have seen an expansion of novel 
efforts to improve safety through workers' compensation. More than a dozen 
states mandate premium discounts for employers with safety programs. In some, 
the safety programs must meet defined criteria or must be certified by the state. 
A growing number of states mandate safety committees through workers' 
compensation statutes and regulations and through state safety codes. Oregon 
and Washington, for example, require all employers with more than 10  employ­
ees to maintain safety committees. Twenty states require insurers to provide 
safety services. For instance, in California, insurers must submit to the workers' 
compensation agency safety plans targeting high-hazard employers and must 
provide certified safety services to all employers. Other states, including Con­
necticut, Michigan, and New York, have assessed surcharges on workers' 
compensation premiums to fund occupational safety and health education. Still, 
we know virtually nothing about the effectiveness of any of these methods. 
Controlling medical costs holds promise as a method of reducing workers' 
compensation costs without reducing benefits. As in nonworkers' compensa­
tion settings, managed care appears to reduce costs. Well-designed fee sched­
ules also may reduce costs. However, research to date has focused on impacts 
on costs and not on the quality of care. The only information currently available 
suggests that injured workers are less satisfied with the care provided in an 
HMO setting than in a fee-for-service setting. Taken as a whole, the evidence 
does not support the hypothesis that employer choice of medical provider 
reduces medical costs. But the choice of treating provider may affect how 
quickly workers return to work and the level of benefits they receive. Although 
these issues are at the periphery of research, they are central concerns of both 
employers and labor unions. 
Reducing litigation also can improve the functioning of workers' compen­
sation systems. Without litigation, benefits can be delivered more quickly and 
at lower costs. In states where litigation is common, injured workers need 
attorneys to give them information and to ensure they receive all the benefits 
to which they are entitled. To protect workers' rights, attempts to reduce 
litigation must include provisions for the workers' compensation agency to 
provide information to workers about benefits due and to ensure that employers . 
and insurers pay these benefits. 
Workers' compensation systems are very inefficient, providing limited ben­
efits to injured workers at excessive costs. Additional research, evaluating 
options for more effective delivery of benefits, could be of great value. 
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